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Abstract  
Passage of the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, in conjunction with a Supreme Court 
ruling supporting a Freedom of Information Act request, required the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) to disclose bank-specific information about its emergency lending during the 
financial crisis. The disclosures revealed the extent to which the Fed had served as a 
global lender of last resort, providing dollar liquidity to foreign banks and foreign central 
banks. I exploit these unanticipated disclosures on two levels. First, I use the disclosed 
information to evaluate the motivations behind the Fed's global lending during the 
crisis. My findings indicate that the Fed supported foreign banks in countries in which 
U.S. money center banks had high loan exposures, which suggests that the Fed 
served the interests of major U.S. banks. Second, I explore the congressional 
response to the revelation of the Fed's massive global lending. I analyze an "Audit the 
Fed" vote in the House of Representatives that would end the Fed's confidentiality 
about the banks and countries it supports and reduce its monetary policy 
independence. I find the influence of U.S. money center banks also extends to 
Congress by way of campaign contributions: contributions from these banks 
significantly reduce the likelihood that a representative will vote in favor of the bill.  In 
addition, I find that right-wing representatives were substantially more likely than their 
left-wing peers to support the bill, which suggests that new congressional coalitions are 
forming on the role of the Fed in the (global) economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On December 1, 2010, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) released previously confidential 
information about its special emergency programs during the financial crisis, as required by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  The Fed’s disclosures included 
the names of the financial institutions and foreign central banks that received financial assistance 
from the Fed during the crisis, the amounts borrowed, the dates credits were extended, the 
interest rates charged, information about collateral, and a description and rationale of the credit 
terms under each Federal Reserve emergency facility.
1
 While the Dodd-Frank law did not require 
the release of these details for crisis lending through the Fed’s regular discount window, the Fed 
was forced to disclose this information by order of the Supreme Court on March 31, 2011 after 
Wall Street bankers and the Fed ran out of legal appeals to block publication.
2
 
 These disclosures revealed the extent to which the Fed had served as a global lender of 
last resort during the crisis, providing liquidity in U.S. dollars to private foreign banks and 
central banks with significant dollar-denominated exposures. The scale of the Fed’s lending to 
foreign banks was truly extraordinary: private foreign banks took over 70% of the Fed’s discount 
window loans during the crisis and about 65% of the loans from its other broad-based facilities 
like the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).  
                                                 
1
 The Fed’s crisis transactions data are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_transaction.htm.   
2
 In 2008, Bloomberg News LP filed a request for the Fed’s discount window data under the 
Freedom of Information Act. When the Fed denied the request, Bloomberg filed a lawsuit and 
then won a trial court ruling in 2009.  The Fed appealed the decision but a federal appeals court 
handed Bloomberg another victory in March 2010. At that point the Fed conceded the issue.  
However, the verdict was appealed by the New York Clearing House Association, which 
represents 10 of the nation’s largest banks.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal on 
March 21, 2011, breaking a policy of confidentiality that dates back to the Fed’s founding. Going 
forward, the Dodd-Frank law stipulates that the Fed must release data on discount-window loans 
after a two-year lag. See Appelbaum 2011.  
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Moreover, the Fed’s largest program, accounting for over 25% of its total assets, channeled over 
half a trillion dollars to foreign central banks via “Central Bank Liquidly Swap Lines”—bilateral 
agreements in which the Fed swapped dollars for foreign currency with other central banks who 
then used the dollars to provide liquidity to private institutions in their jurisdictions.
3
 
Until the disclosures, the Fed had suppressed this information because it has no mandate 
to support foreign banks or serve as lender of last resort to the rest of the world, and because of 
the potentially explosive political reaction in Congress to what would appear as a massive 
foreign aid program for banks.
4
  On the day the Fed published the first installment of this 
detailed information on its Web site, news organizations from around the world touted the 
unexpectedly large participation of foreign banks in the various Fed programs.  The Financial 
Times headlined with “European Banks Took Big Slice of Fed Aid” and noted that “foreign 
banks were among the biggest beneficiaries of the $3,300bn in emergency credit provided by the 
Federal Reserve during the crisis…a revelation…that underlines the global nature of the turmoil 
and the crucial role of the Fed as the lender of last resort for the world’s banking sector.”5  The 
New York Times highlighted the global aspects of the Fed’s crisis lending and quoted the 
response of socialist Senator Bernie Sanders (VT), author of the Dodd-Frank disclosure 
provision: “After years of stonewalling by the Fed, the American people are finally learning the 
incredible and jaw-dropping details of the Fed’s multitrillion-dollar bailout of Wall Street and 
corporate America. Perhaps most surprising is the huge sum that went to bail out foreign private 
banks and corporations including two European megabanks--Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse--
                                                 
3
 Goldberg, et al 2010. 
4
 Irwin (2013, 154) reports that “The scale of lending to foreign banks…was a closely guarded 
secret even by standards of the always secretive Fed….During the panic, this information was so 
closely held—and had it been known publically, so potentially explosive—that only two people 
at each of the dozen reserve banks were allowed access to it.” 
5
 Hardin et al. 2010. 
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which were the largest beneficiaries of the Fed's purchase of mortgage-backed securities.”6  
Three months later, when the Fed released the details of its discount window lending by order of 
the Supreme Court, Bloomberg News headlined with “Foreign Banks Tapped Fed’s Secret 
Lifeline Most at Crisis Peak.” Bloomberg reported that foreign banks accounted for “at least 70 
percent of the $110.7 billion borrowed” at the discount window at the peak of the crisis in 
October 2008.
7
 
 The Fed’s disclosures were unanticipated: Fed officials could not have known at the time 
of the crisis that they would later be required to reveal the transaction-specific details of their 
emergency liquidity operations. The Fed’s policy had always been to keep these the names of the 
borrowers and counterparties confidential, on the grounds there is a stigma attached to borrowing 
from the Fed during a crisis.  As Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke put it, “Releasing the names of 
these institutions in real-time, in the midst of the financial crisis, would have seriously 
undermined the effectiveness of the emergency lending and the confidence of investors and 
borrowers.”8  But the disclosure requirements were not contemplated until after the crisis (and 
will only be required in the future with a two-year lag, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank law).
9
  
Bernie Sanders’ disclosure amendment to the Dodd-Frank bill was introduced nearly two years 
after the Fed’s emergency lending peaked.10  Likewise, lending through the Fed’s discount 
window peaked nearly two years before the Supreme Court required the Fed to release data on its 
discount window loans during the crisis.  It is unlikely that either the Fed itself or the banks that 
                                                 
6
 Sewall and McGinty 2010. 
7
 Keoun and Torres 2011. 
8
 Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/emergency-lending-financial-
crisis-20111206.pdf  
9
 As required by the Dodd-Frank law, the Fed is now releasing the transaction details of its 
discount window and open market operations with a two-year lag. 
10
 Sanders’ disclosure amendment (S.AMDT.3738) was proposed on May 6, 2010 and approved 
by a vote of 98-0 on May 11, 2010. 
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made use of the Fed’s crisis programs could have anticipated these disclosures at the time they 
were making their crisis decisions. 
 I exploit the unanticipated nature of the disclosures at two levels of analysis.  At the 
international level, I use the disclosed information to examine the motivations behind the Federal 
Reserve’s global operations during the 2007-2010 crisis.  I focus on the Fed’s selection of 
foreign central banks to receive “Central Bank Liquidly Swap Lines,” the bilateral agreements 
that enabled 14 central banks in Europe and elsewhere to funnel dollars to private banks in their 
jurisdictions.  I focus on the swap agreements because the Fed had discretion over which central 
banks to select for these facilities. My findings suggest that political factors help account for the 
selection into swap agreements. In fact, controlling for a central bank’s dollar liquidity needs as 
well as a number of other economic characteristics, I find that the best predictor of a central bank 
being selected by the Fed for a currency swap arrangement is the exposure of private U.S. banks 
to a foreign market (where “exposure” is measured as the share of the individual foreign market 
in the total consolidated foreign claims of U.S. money center banks).
11
  This variable alone 
accounts for 59% of the variation in the dependent variable is robust to a number of economic 
and financial controls.  The finding suggests that the Federal Reserve was motivated to serve as a 
lender of last resort for certain foreign countries at least in part because it served the interests of 
the major U.S. banks.  This interpretation is consistent with Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), who 
focus more narrowly on the Fed’s selection of four emerging markets for swap lines, and with 
McDowell’s (2012) qualitative analysis of the Fed’s international lending during the crisis. 
 The second way I use the disclosures follows from this finding but involves domestic 
politics. Within the United States, the disclosures contributed to a congressional backlash against 
                                                 
11
 “Money center banks” are defined as large private financial institutions located in the nation’s 
financial centers that conduct almost all the nation’s international lending. 
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the Federal Reserve’s policy of confidentiality and its political independence.  This reaction is 
important because the Federal Reserve is beholden to the U.S. Congress for its authorities and its 
independence and must therefore maintain a support coalition in Congress to protect itself from 
legislative challenges.
12
  When the disclosures revealed that the Fed had provided more aid to 
foreign banks and central banks than to domestic banks, legislative pressure on the Fed 
intensified in Congress.
13
  This pressure culminated in Ron Paul’s 2012 “Audit the Fed” 
legislation, which would end the Fed’s confidentiality about the banks and countries it supports 
and reduce the Fed’s monetary policy independence. The bill was very popular in the House of 
Representatives where it was approved on July 25, 2012 by a roll-call vote of 327-98. 
 I analyze voting on this bill and find that the influence of large U.S. money center banks 
extends to Congress by way of campaign contributions: contributions from money center banks 
reduce the likelihood that a representative will vote in favor of the bill by 15 percentage points, 
plus or minus 5%.  This result establishes a connection between the international and domestic 
levels as private U.S. banks appear to have influence over both the Fed’s global decisions and the 
congressional response to those decisions. 
 It may not come as a surprise that the Federal Reserve is responsive to the influence of 
private sector financial interests.  After all, the formal structure of the Federal Reserve ensures 
that individuals with careers and backgrounds in the banking sector will hold leadership 
positions throughout the Federal Reserve System.
14
  Furthermore, private bankers have 
privileged access to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) via the Federal Advisory 
                                                 
12
 Hetzel 1986; Kane 1982. 
13
 For a narrative of events, see Irwin 2013.  
14
 Adolph 2013; Faust 1996; Havrilesky 1995; Havrilesky and Gildea 1991; Woolley 1984. 
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Council.
15
  By the same token, there is substantial agreement that private financial institutions 
hold sway over Congress via campaign funding.
16
  In this paper, I extend the analysis to the 
Fed’s international actions during the recent crisis and consider whether the interests of U.S. 
banks were reflected in the Fed’s global choices as well as in the voting behavior of legislators in 
the responses to these choices. 
 In the process of analyzing the congressional response to the disclosures, I uncover a 
surprising new result of importance to the structure of the Federal Reserve: voting on the Audit 
the Fed bill marked a pronounced break with the past in terms of the legislator ideology and 
partisanship such that the Left is now positioning itself as the defender of the Fed (by voting 
against the bill) while the Right is attacking it for generating moral hazard on a global scale by 
giving bailouts to foreign banks.  All but one Republican representative voted in favor of Paul’s 
anti-Fed legislation while Democrats split about evenly (89-97), largely on ideological grounds.  
Focusing only on Democrats (which eliminates the concern that election-year presidential 
politics influenced member voting), I find that right-wing Democrats were as much as 67 
percentage points more likely to vote “yes” on this bill than left-wing Democrats.  In short, in the 
aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the Left is now defending the 
Federal Reserve while the Right is challenging it to be more transparent, more accountable, and 
dramatically less “global”. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides background on the financial crisis 
and a summary of the Fed’s global lender-of-last-resort activities.  Section 3 introduces the data, 
                                                 
15
 The Federal Advisory Council was established in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 specifically 
to provide the banking industry with a powerful voice in policy deliberations. The council is 
composed of representatives of primarily large banks appointed by the board of directors of each 
of the Federal Reserve banks.  See Havrilesky 1990. 
16
 Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010; Kroszner and Strahan 1999; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998. 
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models, and results of my analyses of the Fed’s currency swap arrangements.  Section 4 moves 
to the congressional level and provides analyses of voting on the Audit the Fed bill.  Section 5 
concludes with a discussion of the Fed’s new support coalition in Congress and the implications 
for the structure of the Federal Reserve. 
 
2. The Fed’s Global Lending during the Crisis 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the Fed responsibility for both setting monetary policy 
and for maintaining the stability of U.S. financial markets.  In the latter capacity, the Fed 
supervises U.S. banks (as well as foreign banks with branches in the U.S. that are members of 
the Federal Reserve System) and provides lender-of-last-resort services to these institutions 
during crises.  During the 2007-2010 financial crisis, the Fed provided more than a trillion 
dollars in emergency loans to the financial sector to address the breakdown of interbank and 
other money markets and to avert the failure of individual firms of systemic-importance, like 
AIG.  According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), which conducted a one-time audit of 
the Fed’s emergency operations under the authority of the Dodd-Frank law, “the scale and nature 
of this assistance amounted to an unprecedented expansion of the Federal Reserve System’s 
traditional role as lender-of-last-resort.”17 
 The programs were unprecedented partly because of their international scope.  The 
largest program, measured in terms of the peak dollar amount of loans outstanding, was the 
Central Bank Liquidly Swap Lines program (see Table 1).  But other emergency programs, such 
as the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) were 
                                                 
17
 United States GAO 2011, 1. 
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also tapped by foreign financial institutions via their branches in the United States.
18
  In fact, 
U.S. branches and subsidiaries of foreign institutions received more than half of the total dollar 
amount of TAF and CPFF loans made (see Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 1).  Foreign banks 
were also heavy borrowers at the Fed’s discount window during the crisis.  Table 4 indicates that 
15 of the 30 largest borrowers (measured by peak loan amount) at the discount window were 
branches or agencies of foreign banks.  Overall, the Fed provided loans to banks from 26 foreign 
countries. 
 The proximate reason the Fed provided last-resort loans to non-U.S. banks was that 
foreign financial institutions experienced severe funding shortages in U.S. dollars after interbank 
markets froze up in October 2008.
19
  These dollar shortages were a direct outgrowth of the 
explosive growth of cross-border banking since 2000.  As depicted in Figure 2, foreign banks, 
particularly European banks, began accumulating large amounts of dollar-denominated assets, 
including subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), via the shadow banking system.
20
 
Dollar-denominated assets of banks outside the U.S. peaked at a whopping $10 trillion before the 
crisis, an amount equal to the total assets of the U.S. commercial banking sector.
21
  Those were 
the dollar assets on their books. But foreign banks had a similar amount of dollar liabilities 
because they had funded their dollar asset positions in short-term wholesale markets, particularly 
by borrowing dollars from U.S. money market mutual funds.  This led to the build-up of maturity 
                                                 
18
 Foreign banks and bank holding companies operating in the U.S. are eligible for Federal 
Reserve services—including emergency services—under the principle of “national treatment,” or 
parity of treatment between domestic and foreign banks. 
19
 Shin 2012; Goldberg, et al. 2010; McGuire and von Peter 2009; Allen and Moessner 2010; 
Fleming and Klagge 2010. 
20
 The shadow banking system is the collection of non-bank financial intermediaries that provide 
services similar to traditional commercial banks outside the purview of regulators.  It includes 
hedge funds, money market funds, structured investment vehicles, and the off-balance sheet 
activities of investment banks. 
21
 Shin 2012. 
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and currency mismatches: given their reliance on U.S. short-term wholesale for dollar funding, 
foreign banks were vulnerable to losses on their long-dated and illiquid dollar-denominated 
subprime assets. When wholesale dollar funding markets tightened during the credit crisis--and 
then froze completely after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in October 2008--foreign banks 
could not roll over their dollar liabilities. Although the resulting dollar liquidity crisis affected 
both U.S. and foreign banks, it was particularly acute for foreign banks since they did not hold 
significant U.S. dollar deposits and relied more heavily on the wholesale and swap markets to 
fund their dollar-denominated assets.  In short, the rapid expansion of cross-border borrowing 
and lending in U.S. dollars placed the Federal Reserve in the unprecedented position of having to 
provide dollar liquidity to banks throughout the globally-integrated financial system. 
 In response to the global dollar liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve simultaneously 
established two programs: the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Central Bank Liquidly Swap 
Lines program.  While the TAF addressed domestic dollar funding pressures, the Fed recognized 
that the new facility was unlikely to alleviate dollar funding pressures overseas since interbank 
lending was effectively frozen and foreign central banks’ could not create dollars (typically, 
central banks lend to domestic banks in domestic currency).  Although U.S. branches of foreign 
banks could borrow dollars from the Fed, many foreign banks could not.  The Fed stepped in by 
offering dollar swap lines to foreign central banks, which enabled these central banks to provide 
dollar liquidity to banks within their jurisdictions.  According to Bordo, “These swap lines 
essentially extended the Term Auction Facility’s reach beyond U.S. borders by financing term 
dollar funding facilities for foreign banks.”22 
                                                 
22
 Bordo et al 2012, 8. 
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 The Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) approved temporary swap lines 
with 14 central banks between December 2007 and October 2008 (Table 5).  These central banks 
used the U.S. dollars obtained through the swap lines to make dollar loans to private financial 
institutions in their jurisdictions. The foreign central banks assumed the risk of losses on these 
dollar loans and paid the Fed interest.
23
  Figure 3 illustrates how these swap agreement worked.  
For example, in the first currency swap with the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 20, 
2007, the Fed exchanged $10 billion for an equivalent value of euros—€6.93 billion at the 
prevailing exchange rate of 1.442 dollars per euro—and the ECB then lent those dollars to banks 
in the Eurozone that were suffering from a dollar shortage.  There was no exchange rate risk for 
the Fed since the exchange rate was fixed at the time of the agreement.  Moreover, the ECB 
assumed all the credit risk on the dollar loans it made to private banks in the Eurozone.  While 
the “tenor” (number of days until the swap matured) varied, this particular swap matured in 28 
days and required the ECB to pay the Fed an interest rate of 4.65% during that period.  At 
maturity, the ECB returned $10 billion to the Fed and the Fed returned €6.934 billion to the 
ECB, closing out the transaction.   The process was repeated until the dollar shortage crisis 
abated in early 2010.  During that time, the Fed conducted 271 separate swap transactions with 
the ECB, totaling $171 billion in currency swaps (Table 5). 
 Dollars outstanding to all 14 foreign central banks peaked at $586 billion in December 
2008, with the ECB accounting for about 80 percent of total dollars drawn (Table 5).  At the 
peak, the temporary swap lines accounted for over 25 percent of the Fed’s total assets.24  By 
most accounts, the swaps were successful in channeling dollar liquidity abroad, signaling central 
                                                 
23
 Fleming and Klagge 2010. 
24
 Ibid, 5. 
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bank cooperation, and calming markets.
25
  The swap lines expired in February 2010.  However, 
the Fed reauthorized the swap lines with five foreign central banks in May 2010 in response to 
strains in dollar funding markets associated with the Eurozone debt crisis.  As the Eurozone 
crisis continues, five swap lines have been reauthorized, with the latest extension running to 
February 2014.  Figure 4 shows the outstanding value of the Fed’s dollar swaps to June 2013. I 
focus on the Fed liquidity swaps conducted during the subprime crisis because of their larger 
scale and broader scope: swaps arrangements peaked at nearly $600 billion in late-2008 and 
involved central banks from nearly every region of the world. 
 How did the Federal Reserve determine which central banks to select for swap lines 
during the subprime crisis?  We learn from the GAO audit mandated by the Dodd-Frank law that 
the FOMC had control over these decisions and consideration began once a foreign central bank 
requested a swap line: “The FOMC’s consideration of a new swap line arrangement generally 
followed a request from an interested foreign central bank, but not all requests were granted.”26  
Hence, establishing a swap arrangement required a request from a foreign central bank and 
approval by the FOMC.  While the names of the central banks that were denied swap lines by 
the FOMC are not public knowledge, the GAO audit did reveal the criteria the FOMC said it 
used to evaluate these requests.  Based on internal memorandums and communication with 
Federal Reserve Board staff, the GAO found that the FOMC’s approval of swap line requests 
“were generally based on the economic and financial mass of the country’s economy, a record of 
sound economic management, and the probability that the swap line would make an economic 
difference.”  The GAO audit also noted that  “the swap line arrangements were generally made 
with foreign central banks of important U.S. trading partners or global financial centers, such as 
                                                 
25
 Goldberg, et al. 2010; Baba et al. 2009; Obstfeld et al. 2009. 
26
 United States GAO 2011, 118. 
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Switzerland, Japan, and England, based on global funding needs.”27  Further insight into the 
selection of foreign central banks comes from FOMC member William Poole, President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Poole voted against establishing swap lines with the ECB 
and the Swiss National Bank on that the grounds that these central banks held large foreign 
currency reserves, presumably in dollars, that could be used to backstop dollar liquidity in 
Europe (Minutes 11 December 2007). 
The broader point is that the Fed selected central banks for swap lines on basis of certain 
objective economic and financial considerations.  Yet political exigencies may also have 
influenced the Fed’s list of criteria (Irwin 2013, 154-155).  The Fed may have realized that 
revelation of its massive lending to foreign banks and central banks would smack of “foreign 
aid”—which is always controversial in Congress—and therefore tried to justify the swaps as 
being in the interests of the United States.
28
  This could explain why the FOMC included a 
country’s importance as trading partner on its list of criteria. A “record of sound economic 
management” may also have been included for a similar reason:  if the Fed had conducted a 
swap with a foreign central bank that was widely viewed as politically dependent and 
untrustworthy—say, the central bank of Peru or Russia—it might be hard to justify the swap to 
Congress.  Then again, FOMC officials may simply have been concerned about the ability of 
foreign central bankers to carry out dollar liquidity operations on behalf of the Federal Reserve.  
In this view, which Irwin espouses, Bernanke and other FOMC officials viewed central bankers 
that had demonstrated competence in macroeconomic management as trustworthy.
29
  In any case, 
the FOMCs selection criteria are more or less quantifiable and can therefore be evaluated 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Milner and Tingley (2011) show that right-wing ideology has a large and significant negative 
effect on congressional voting on foreign aid legislation. 
29
 Irwin 2013, 153-155. 
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empirically.  In the analysis below, I control for these considerations in an effort to isolate the 
influence of private U.S. money center banks on the Fed’s choice of central banks for swap 
agreements.  Money center banks comprise the interest group that I expect to wield influence 
over the Federal Reserve’s international credit policies during the crisis. 
 
3. Correlates of the Fed’s Central Bank Swap Arrangements  
My measure of cross-country variation in the Fed’s foreign lending decisions during the 
subprime crisis is SWAP LINE, an indicator variable equal to one if the Federal Reserve selected 
a country or central bank jurisdiction for a dollar swap line during the crisis.  Fourteen central 
banks received swap lines from the Fed between December 2007 and October 2008 (Table 5).  I 
draw on the FOMC’s swap line selection criteria to estimate the economic, financial, and 
potentially political covariates of the Fed’s foreign lending during the crisis.  I also consider an 
interest group covariate: the loan exposure of U.S. money center banks to foreign markets.  
Previous research has shown that U.S. money center banks comprise a key constituency for 
international last-resort lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s Exchange Stabilization Fund.30  This is because such last-resort lending 
ensures that the countries in which these banks are highly exposed are protected under the 
lender’s insurance umbrella.31  
 I expect that U.S. money center banks will have substantial influence over the Fed’s 
international credit policies during financial crises.  According to Woolley, “Bankers are the sole 
interest group with the combination of access and technical expertise required to successfully 
                                                 
30
 The U.S. Treasury Department’s ESF was tapped to provide financial rescues to emerging 
market economies during the 1990s. 
 
31
 Gould 2003; Oatley 2002. 
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affect [Fed] policy choice.”32  But banks in the nation’s money center of New York City have 
special access, particularly when it comes to the Fed’s foreign policies, because the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) conducts all international operations for the Federal 
Reserve and, during the recent crisis, implemented all of the Fed’s emergency facilities.33  
Moreover, the FRBNY is also the largest (by assets) and most influential of the 12 regional 
Federal Reserve Banks and the only regional bank with a permanent vote on the FOMC.  Private 
bankers elect two-thirds of the FRBNY’s Board of Directors and the FRBNY president--who is 
usually selected from a Wall Street bank--maintains close connections with bankers during his 
tenure.  For example, when reporters from the New York Times examined Timothy Geithner’s 
personal calendar (obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request), they found that he 
“forged unusually close relationships with executives of Wall Street’s giant financial 
institutions” during his five years as president of the FRBNY.34 
In short, money center banks comprise the dominant constituency for the FRBNY.  They 
maintain a formal role in selecting the FRBNY’s leadership and they have close informal 
connections to its president—arguably, the Fed’s most powerful international policymaker.  
These connections suggest that money center banks could have had influence on the Fed’s swap 
line decisions. But what interests do money center banks have in these swap arrangements? 
Beyond their size, the crucial feature that distinguishes money center banks from other 
banks is that that engage in international lending.  In fact, just eleven money center banks 
account for almost all the foreign loans extended by U.S. financial institutions.  According to 
data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, the following money center 
                                                 
32
 Woolley 1984, 28. 
33
 United States GAO 2011. 
34
 Becker and Morgenson 2009, A1. 
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banks accounted for 93% of all the consolidated foreign claims of U.S. banks in 2007: Bank of 
America Corp., Bank of New York Co., Citigroup, Deutsche Bank (Taunus Corp.), HSBC 
Holdings PLC., JPMorgan Chase, State Street Corp., Wachovia Corp., and Wells Fargo.
35
 
The concentrated nature of foreign lending suggests a simple hypothesis: U.S. money 
center banks would prefer to have the Fed extend swap agreements to countries in which they are 
most heavily exposed, all factors considered.  That is, financial self-interest may have played a 
role in the selection of swap arrangements.
36
  I argue that dollar swap arrangements were more 
likely in foreign markets where private U.S. banks were highly exposed because this is where 
swap facilities conferred the greatest benefits on the exposed U.S. banks. Without access to 
dollar funding via Fed currency swaps, private foreign banks needing to rollover their dollar 
liabilities would have been severely impaired, necessitating the abrupt forced sale of their dollar 
assets. This deleveraging of dollar assets would have exacerbated problems for U.S. banks, 
which had counterparty relationships with foreign banks.
37
  As an agent of private U.S. banks, 
the Federal Reserve thus selectively targeted foreign central banks for bilateral swap 
arrangements, favoring those that were more important to the financial interests of U.S. banks 
and discriminating against those that were less important.  The relevant implication is that not all 
central banks could expect help from the Federal Reserve during periods of global financial 
turmoil.  The Fed favored foreign markets that were more important to the U.S., which are those 
where private U.S. banks have high loan exposures. 
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 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Statistical Release E.16, December 31, 
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 McDowell 2012; Aizenman and Pasricha 2010. 
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 As McDowell (2012, 185) put it, “Ultimately, by implementing the swap programme, the Fed 
stepped in when wholesale markets failed and effectively delivered dollars to foreign central 
banks which then delivered the currency to their national banks, allowing them to continue 
servicing their dollar-denominated debt [to U.S. financial institutions].” 
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My measure of the interests of U.S. money center banks is U.S. BANK EXPOSURE, the 
consolidated claims of U.S. banks on individual countries divided by the consolidated claims of 
U.S. banks on all countries in December 2007.
38
  These data highlight the role of large financial 
institutions located in the nation’s money centers (i.e., “money center banks”) because these 
large banks conduct almost all the nation’s international lending.  My argument is that U.S. 
money center banks benefit when the Fed provides dollar liquidity to foreign countries in which 
they are highly exposed.  The bank exposure variable ranges from zero (indicating that U.S. 
banks had no financial claims on a country’s financial and non-financial institutions in 2007) to 
maximum of 0.24 for the Eurozone (indicating that U.S. banks had extended nearly one-quarter 
of their total foreign loans to Eurozone institutions).  
 While it is not possible to observe money center bank influence directly, we can assess 
the degree which the Fed’s selection of swap lines correlates with their interests.  Table 6 reports 
the results of probit regressions of SWAP LINE on U.S. BANK EXPOSURE and controls.  The 
dependant variable takes the value of one for countries that the FOMC selected for dollar swap 
lines between December 2007 and October 2008, zero otherwise (see Table 5).  Since the ECB 
received a swap line for all members of the currency union, I code a single observation for the 
ECB and sum (or average, where appropriate) covariate values of the 12 Eurozone member 
countries in 2007.  The results show a positive and significant U.S.BANK EXPOSURE estimate 
across all four models, which is consistent with Aizenman and Pasricha’s (2010) results for the 
smaller group of emerging market nations.  In Model 1, this covariate alone accounts for 59% of 
the variation in the data.  But the fit improves Models 2-4 and provides some evidence in support 
of the Fed’s selection criteria. The set of controls is derived from the GAO’s audit, during which 
                                                 
38
 Bank of International Settlements (BIS), Consolidated Banking Statistics, Table 9B, Foreign 
claims by nationality of reporting banks, immediate borrower basis. 
17 
 
FOMC members and Federal Reserve staff described the factors that shaped their selection of 
countries for swap lines. The following criteria were highlighted by Fed officials as increasing 
the chances a foreign central bank would be selected for a swap line: 
 
 The economic and financial “mass” of the country or central bank jurisdiction 
 Whether the country/jurisdiction was home to a global financial center 
 The country’s or jurisdiction’s importance to the U.S. as a trading partner 
 The central bank’s record of sound economic management 
 The central bank’s foreign currency reserves 
 The dollar funding needs of foreign private financial institutions 
 
Controlling for these factors is important because many of these variables are correlated with 
U.S. BANK EXPOSURE (see Appendix 1 for the correlation matrix).  In Model 2, I control for 
a country’s “economic mass” with GDP (a country’s gross domestic product divided by total 
world GDP, in billions USD, 2007), and a country’s “financial mass” with LIQUID 
LIABILITIES (a country’s liquid liabilities divided by total world liquid liabilities, in millions of 
USD, 2007).
39
   Liquid liabilities—aka M3—equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries.  It is the broadest available indicator of the 
extent of financial intermediation and therefore a suitable proxy for a country’s financial 
importance or “financial mass”.   
In Model 2, the estimate for GDP is positive and significant at the 10% level.  This gives 
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jurisdiction in 2007. 
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some credence to the FOMC’s claim that it considered the “economic mass” of a country (or 
central bank jurisdiction) when allocating swap lines.  However, GDP is not significant in Model 
3 and it is wrongly signed (but not significant) in Model 4. LIQUID LIABILITIES is significant 
in Models 2 and 3 but wrongly signed, given the FOMC’s claim about how it allocated swap 
lines.  It appears that countries with greater shares of the world’s total financial intermediation 
were less likely to participate in a swap arrangement with the Fed.  Perhaps financially-important 
countries were less likely to need (and therefore request) a swap line from the Fed.  Or perhaps 
the Fed was less likely to grant such requests when they came from financially-important 
countries.  Without knowing the full list of countries that approached the Fed for assistance, we 
can’t discriminate between these accounts.  But either way, the result cuts against the Fed’s 
claim that it considered “financial mass” when it established swap agreements with central 
banks. 
 Models 2 and 3 introduce BILATERAL TRADE, which is U.S. bilateral trade with a 
country (imports plus exports) as a share of total U.S. trade (imports plus exports) in 2007.
40
  The 
sign on this estimated effect of BILATERAL TRADE in both models is negative (but not 
significant), which cuts against the Fed’s claim that swaps were more likely to be given to 
important U.S. trading partners.  This is consistent with Aizenman and Pasricha’s (2010) result 
for the smaller set of emerging market nations.  The results suggest that the FOMC’s argument 
about supporting countries that are important U.S. trading partners may have been an ex-post sop 
to Congress.  In any case, there is no evidence that the Fed’s foreign assistance to banks in other 
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countries was based on U.S. trade relationships.
41
 
Models 2-4 controls for INFLATION, which is a proxy for the FOMC’s concern with the 
competence of a central bank and its “record of sound economic management.” When a central 
bank presides over stable and low inflation, the Fed may have been more likely to view is it as a 
credible partner in extending dollar liquidity to local banks.  INFLATION is measured as the 
annual percentage change in CPI inflation averaged over the previous decade (1997-2007).
42
  In 
all three models, the INFLATION estimate is negative and significant, suggesting that the 
FOMC did considered “sound economic management” as a criterion for selection.  Countries 
with higher average inflation rates over the prior decade were less likely to receive a swap 
agreement with the Fed.
43
  This consistent with the characterization of foreign central banks as 
competent “subcontractors” for the Fed, providing dollar lender-of-last-resort services in foreign 
jurisdictions.
44
 
 Models 2 and 3 also control for a central bank’s foreign currency reserves with 
RESERVES, in line with FOMC member William Poole’s concern that the Fed should not grant 
swap facilities to central banks with large international reserves.  RESERVES are measured as a 
central bank’s total international reserves (excluding gold) as a share of GDP.45  Although the 
currency composition of official reserves is not available, it is acceptable to assume that currency 
reserves correlate closely with U.S. dollar reserves, since the dollar is the world’s dominant 
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reserve currency.
46
  The estimates in Models 2 and 3 suggest that William Poole’s argument was 
relevant to selection: central banks with large official reserves were less likely to participate in 
Fed swap agreements.  However, without knowing the names of all the central banks that 
approached the Fed for swap lines, we cannot infer whether large reserves reduced the likelihood 
that a central bank would request a swap line or whether large reserves reduced the odds the Fed 
would grant a swap line once it was requested. 
 The final criterion mentioned by the FOMC—private foreign banks’ “need” for dollar 
liquidity—is potentially the most important but data availability is limited to a smaller sample of 
countries. Models 3 and 4 controls for the “dollar funding needs” of private financial institutions 
in foreign countries with DOLLAR SHORTAGES, which is constructed from the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics following the method elaborated in 
Allen and Moessner (2010). The BIS collects data on the currency-specific claims and liabilities 
of banks for a subset of 39 BIS reporting countries.
47
 Although this dramatically reduces the 
sample size in Models 3 and 4, it does provide a fairly accurate measure of “dollar liquidity 
needs”.  Specifically, DOLLAR SHORTAGES is measured as the net outstanding U.S. dollar 
cross-border claims on BIS reporting banks and non-banks in a country/jurisdiction in December 
2008, where “net” is defined as total dollar cross-border liabilities minus claims in all foreign 
and domestic currencies at the end of 2008.  By this measure, the largest dollar liquidity shortage 
was in the United Kingdom (-$153.6 billion), which was the largest borrower from the Federal 
Reserve during the crisis (Table 5). Since negative values indicate dollar shortages, I expect the 
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estimated effect of DOLLAR SHORTAGES to be negative. 
While the estimate of DOLLAR SHORTAGES is negative as expected in both models, it 
is significant only in Model 4, which drops BILATERAL TRADE and RESERVES in order to 
maximize sample size and substitutes GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER for LIQUID 
LIABILITIES as a proxy for international financial importance. GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CENTER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a country is home to a global financial center 
city.
48
  The DOLLAR SHORTAGE estimate is negative and significant in this model, which 
accords with the Fed’s criterion: countries with “greater need” of dollar liquidity were more 
likely to get a swap line from the Fed.  GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER also enters positively 
and significantly, which supports the Fed’s statements on this criterion. 
 The central point is that, despite the introduction of numerous controls and changes in the 
sample, the estimate on U.S BANK EXPOSURE remains positive and significance across all 
four models in Table 6. To get a sense of the magnitude of the effect, Figure 5 plots the 
predictive margins and confidence intervals of receiving a Fed swap line from Model 3, holding 
covariates to their means while increasing U.S. BANK EXPOSURE from its minimum to its 
maximum value.  The figure illustrates the substantively large effect of U.S. bank exposure on 
the probability of receiving a Fed swap line. When U.S. money center banks have $1 billion in 
claims on a country’s residents, the chance of participating in a Fed swap is just 13%.  But when 
U.S. banks hold $41 billion in claims on a country’s residents, the probability of getting a Fed 
swap rises to 57%, a 44 percentage point increase.  The loan exposure of U.S. banks appears to 
be a powerful predictor of Fed swap lines. 
                                                 
48
 The Global Financial Centres Index at http://www.zyen.com  designates cities in 7 countries as 
“global financial centers”: Canada (Toronto), Germany/Eurozone (Frankfurt), Hong Kong, Japan 
(Tokyo), Singapore, Switzerland (Zurich), and the United Kingdom (London). 
22 
 
 Overall, the results in Table 6 reveal a remarkably consistent pattern: foreign central 
banks that participated in the Fed swap line program were in areas where U.S. banks held larger 
claims. In other words, the exposure of U.S. banks to a foreign country correlates strongly and 
positively with the Federal Reserve’s swap line decisions. This suggests that the private foreign 
banks that tapped the Fed’s swap lines for dollar liquidity had counterparty relationships with 
U.S. banks that overlap closely with U.S. banks’ foreign lending exposures.   
 
4. Congressional Voting on Ron Paul’s “Audit the Fed” Bill 
 Immediately following the Federal Reserve’s court-ordered disclosure of the names and 
nationalities of the banks and central banks that had borrowed from the Fed, Ron Paul began 
plans for congressional hearings: “I am surprised and deeply disturbed to learn the staggering 
amount of money that went to foreign banks.  These lending activities provided no benefit to 
American taxpayers, the American economy, or even directly to American banks.”49  Paul’s 
efforts culminated in a bill that would make the Federal Reserve more transparent on a 
permanent basis: The Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2012 (H.R.459).  This legislation, 
popularly known as “Audit the Fed”, was approved by the House of Representatives on July 25, 
2012 and then sent to the Senate, where it is awaiting a place on the legislative calendar.
50
  I 
analyze House voting on this bill to see if the influence of money center banks extends beyond 
the Fed to the political body that has power over the Fed: the U.S. Congress.  I also explore the 
nature of the support coalition in Congress that backs the Federal Reserve and protects it from 
legislative challenges. Inasmuch as Congress created the Federal Reserve and conducts regular 
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oversight of its congressionally-delegated authority, the Fed’s vaunted political independence is 
overstated.  The Fed is beholden to Congress and therefore must maintain a support coalition in 
order to protect its authority.  So, in addition to examining the impact of private-sector banks, I 
also explore the characteristics of Representatives (and their constituents) that shape voting on 
the Audit the Fed bill. 
 The goals of this bill are to make the one-time Dodd-Frank Act disclosures a permanent 
feature of congressional oversight of the Fed and to extend the GAO’s audit authority to the 
Fed’s open market operations.  According to the congressional report that accompanied the bill 
to the floor, the Dodd-Frank Act provided a one-time exception to legal restrictions that 
prevented the GAO from auditing the Fed in four key areas: “(1) Transactions for or with a 
foreign central bank, foreign government or international financing agency; (2) Deliberations, 
decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, including discount window operations, reserves 
of member banks, securities credit, interest on deposits, and open market operations; (3) 
Transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market Committee; and (4) Any 
discussions or communications among or between members of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors and officers and employees of the Federal Reserve System related to the above.”51  
H.R.459 would remove these restrictions.  Elijah Cummings (D-MD) wrote the minority opinion 
section of the report and argued that the bill would critically undermine the political 
independence of the Federal Reserve.
52
 
 The bill was very popular in the House where the vote was taken under a procedure 
called “suspension of the rules.” Suspension is typically used to pass non-controversial bills 
                                                 
51
 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform report, CRPT-112hrpt607-pt1.  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt607/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt607-pt1.pdf 
52
 Ibid 
24 
 
since votes under suspension require two-thirds majority.  The tally of 327-98 easily met this 
threshold.  All Republicans except Robert Turner (R-NY) voted in favor of the bill. But 
Democrats were divided, with 89 Democrats joining Republicans to approve the bill and 97 
voting against. 
 While election-year politics probably had some impact on voting, it is noteworthy that 
Republicans, the traditional supporters of the Fed’s independence, voted en masse for the bill 
while Democrats, the party that usually attacks the Fed as an unaccountable power with 
incestuous relations with banks, lined up as the Fed’s protector.  In a striking indicator of this 
reversal, Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer  (D-MD) implored Democrats to vote “no” on the 
grounds that the bill “impedes the independence of this critical institution…House Republicans 
cannot be allowed to hold our economy or our critical economic institutions hostage in order to 
further their extreme agenda.”53 
 The whip was not effective as almost half of the Democrats broke ranks and voted with 
Republicans.  I analyze Democrats’ vote choice on this bill with an eye toward gauging the 
influence of money center banks and identifying the personal and constituency factors that 
contribute to legislators’ decisions.  While previous research has shown that campaign 
contributions from money center banks shape vote choices in other areas, such as funding for the 
IMF and foreign aid, I extend this analysis to voting on the “Audit the Fed” bill.54  My measure 
of bank influence is BANK CONTRIBUTIONS, operationalized as campaign contributions from 
money center banks’ Political Action Committees (PACs) to representatives during the two 
election cycles prior to the vote, divided by total contributions a representative received from all 
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sources during these two cycles.   My expectation is that representatives that are more dependent 
on banks for campaign contributions are more likely to the vote against H.R.459.  
 I identify “money center banks” from the FFIEC’s list of “Large Financial Institutions” 
that account for over 90% of all foreign banking claims held by U.S. banks (see above).  The 
banks comprising this group are: Bank of America, Bank of New York, Citigroup, Deutsche 
Bank (Taunus Corp.), HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, State Street Corp., Wachovia Corp., and Wells 
Fargo.  Deutsche Bank and HSBC are foreign-owned banks with branches in the United States 
and each has a PAC that contributes to congressional campaigns. This measure thus captures the 
role that money center banks play in Congress via contributions to campaigns. 
 Model 1 in Table 7 reports results of a probit model regression of Democrats’ voting on 
H.R.459.  The BANK CONTRIBUTIONS estimate is negative and statistically significant.  
Model 2 controls for the political “ideology” of representatives using the first dimension DW-
NOMINATE score, which is derived from a spatial model of representatives’ individual roll-call 
voting histories.  As Poole and Rosenthal (2000) explain, the first dimension can be interpreted 
as a representative’s position on government intervention in the economy. Values range from -1 
to 1, with higher values indicating a more right-wing, anti-government ideology. The estimate in 
Model 2 suggests that right-leaning Democrats are more likely than left-leaning Democrats to 
support auditing the Fed.
55
 
 This ideological finding is interesting for two reasons.  First, it suggests that not all 
Republicans that supported the bill did so to harm President Obama’s chances in the upcoming 
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election: right-wing ideology probably mattered too.  Second, it suggests that the revelations of 
the Fed’s massive global operations during the crisis may have reversed ideological positions on 
the Federal Reserve, so that the Right now opposes the Fed for its internationalist, interventionist 
activities while the Left supports it for these very same reasons.
56
 
 However, material factors may have contributed to the Right’s shift in positions.   For 
example, if older, home-owning constituents were especially hard hit by the crisis and also more 
likely to be right-wing, these estimates might be confusing constituent ideology with material 
motivations.  Research on Tea Party adherents indicates that these right-wing constituents tend to 
be older (62 years of age on average), wealthier, and more strongly supportive of the Social 
Security and Medicare programs than moderate conservatives.
57
  As retired homeowners living 
on savings, these constituents may have a material basis for criticizing the Federal Reserve.  On 
the one hand, they may hold the Fed responsible for the housing crisis, since easy credit 
conditions early in the cycle facilitated the boom.  The subsequent bust devastated older citizens 
who saw their primary nest eggs – their homes – plummet in value.  On the other hand, the Fed’s 
stimulus programs in the aftermath of bust have dramatically reduced the return on retiree 
savings.  With deposit interest rates hovering near zero for several years, the Fed became 
vulnerable to attacks from older, more conservative constituents. 
 To control for the possibility that opposition to the Fed among right-leaning constituents 
is based on these material considerations, Model 3 includes SOCIAL SECURITY, which is the 
share of a district’s population receiving OASDI benefits, and FORECLOSURE RATE, which is 
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the share of a district’s private housing stock in foreclosure.58  The estimates are both positively 
signed but not significant.
59
  Given that estimated effect of DW-NOMINATE remains virtually 
unchanged, it is fair to conclude that ideology is driving representatives’ voting, not the 
hardships endured by older constituents during the crisis.  I consider the implications of this 
finding in the conclusion. 
 In Model 4, I control for additional factors to ensure that estimates on bank campaign 
contributions and member ideology are not spurious.  BANK HQ is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if a representative’s district is home to the headquarters to one of the nation’s eleven money 
center banks.  I expected a negative sign since these banks opposed H.R.459.  The estimate, 
however, is positive and but not significant. Note that contributions from banks remain 
negatively and significantly related to voting.  CHAMBER SENIORITY counts the number of 
terms representatives have served in the House.  The estimate is negative and significant, 
indicating that more senior Democrats were less likely to support the bill, in line with their 
party’s whip. Nevertheless, the ideology estimate is hardly affected. FINANCE COMMITTEE is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a representative sits on the House Financial Services 
Committee.
60
  Membership on this committee may be correlated with bank contributions since 
interest groups are known to bestow larger contributions on legislators with greater influence 
over their industries. The estimate is positive but not significant.  Model 5 applies the same 
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analysis to voting by all representatives, Democrats and Republicans.  The estimates are very 
similar to those in Model 4. 
 Figures 6 and 7 presents computed marginal effects from Model 4 (Democrats only).  
Figure 6 illustrates the predictive margins of BANK CONTRIBUTIONS on the probability of 
voting “yes” on Audit the Fed.  According to the figure, there is a 58% chance that a Democrat 
will vote “yes” on the bill when getting a zero share of contributions from money center banks.  
However, a Democrat that gets just 1 percent of his total contributions from banks is 38 
percentage points less likely to favor the bill, with a predicted probability of voting “yes” of 
20%.  Contributions from big banks seem to have large effects even when they comprise 
relatively small shares of representatives’ total receipts. 
 The same holds for member ideology.  According to Figure 7, moving DW-NOMINATE 
from the value of the most left-wing Democrat (Jim McDermott, WA-7) to the value of the most 
right-wing Democrat (Heath Shuler NC-11) increases the odds of voting “yes” on the bill by 67 
percentage points.  Ideology also appears to have a large effect on voting to make the Fed more 
transparent.  Note, however, that the direction of this effect is the reverse of traditional coalition 
patterns.  The Right is now challenging the Fed to be more transparent, more accountable, and 
less beholden to banks while the Left is positioning itself as the defender of the Fed.  I consider 
this historic reversal in the conclusion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The Dodd-Frank law combined with a Supreme Court ruling to force the Federal Reserve 
to disclose nearly all borrower-specific information about its lending during the crisis. The 
disclosures revealed that the Fed had provided vast amounts of dollar liquidity to foreign banks 
and central banks—a consequence of the rapid globalization of banking in the new millennium 
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that left many foreign banks exposed to disruptions in short-term dollar funding markets.  Had 
the Fed not supported foreign banks when these markets froze in 2008, the credit crisis in the 
U.S. would almost certainly have been worse.  In a broader sense, the disclosures revealed that 
the Federal Reserve had become—by default—the lender of last resort to the world’s most 
international private banks. 
 At the time they were making crisis decisions, Federal Reserve officials did not know 
they would have to reveal this borrower-specific information.  In this paper, I exploited the 
unanticipated nature of the disclosures for two purposes. First, I used data from the disclosures to 
evaluate cross-country variation in the Fed’s foreign lending.  I created an indicator variable for 
the 14 central bank jurisdictions the Fed selected for dollar swap lines and regressed this variable 
on set of economic and financial variables that proxy for the Fed’s selection criteria (as revealed 
by the GAO audit), plus a political-economy variable that captures the interests of U.S. money 
center banks: their exposure in a foreign market as a share of their total foreign exposure.  While 
I found some support for the Fed’s selection criteria, the factor that most strongly and 
consistently “predicts” the Fed’s foreign lending is the extent to which large U.S. banks have 
financial claims on a country. 
 It is perhaps impolitic for the Fed to acknowledge the role that money center banks 
played in shaping its crisis decisions.  Yet serving the interests of these banks is a formal 
component of the Fed’s political organization.  Banks elect the majority of the regional reserve 
banks’ directors and the directors of the FRBNY which, in conjunction with the FOMC, manage 
the Fed’s international operations and its crisis programs.  But the Federal Reserve has a greater 
principal to whom it owes its existence: the U.S. Congress. Hence, the second way I exploited 
the disclosures was to examine the congressional response to them. 
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 The revelations of the Fed’s support for foreign banks and central banks prompted 
legislation in the House to make the one-time Dodd-Frank disclosures permanent, and to go 
beyond them in certain areas.  Ron Paul’s “Audit the Fed” bill would remove remaining limits on 
GAO audits of the Fed's operations, including its transactions with foreign central banks and its 
open-market operations, which might compromise the Fed’s political independence.  I analyzed 
voting on this bill with the aim of seeing whether global banks have influence over the Fed’s 
ultimate principal by way of contributions to congressional campaigns.  I found that voting 
against this bill is strongly correlated with the share of campaign contributions representatives 
receive from the 11 money center banks that account for nearly all foreign lending by U.S. 
banks.   I also found something surprising and worthy of further analysis: Right-leaning 
Democrats strongly support auditing the Fed--apparently even at the risk of a politicizing 
monetary policy--while left-leaning Democrats oppose such changes to the Fed’s structure. 
 With all but one Republican voting “yes”, and 97 mostly right-wing Democrats joining 
them, the Fed seems to have fallen out of favor with the Right.  Put another way, Ron Paul’s 
anti-Fed ideas, which have long been considered to be on the fringe, appear to be moving into 
the mainstream. This is a break from the past since the Right has historically supported the 
Federal Reserve for its conservative commitment to monetary stability.  
 What is causing this historic reversal? While it is too soon to say with certainly, the 
analysis suggests that it is not being driven by the hardships that older, conservative home-
owning Americans experienced during the crisis.  My regressions show no correlation between 
voting to audit the Fed and district foreclosure rates, district social security beneficiaries, or the 
share of residents aged 65 and older in a district.  This leaves open the possibility that the Dodd-
Frank/Supreme Court disclosures themselves fueled the Right’s ideological antipathy of the Fed.   
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 The financial crisis downgraded monetary policy to a second-order concern for the Fed, 
which concentrated on restoring stability to the increasingly globalized financial sector.  This 
shift in focus exposed the Fed to attacks from the right of the political spectrum, where people 
tend to see financial instability as caused by excessive government intervention in the economy. 
From this perspective, the Fed’s emergency loans were “bailouts” that created the moral hazard 
that caused banks to take on too much risk in the first place. In addition, the disclosures revealed 
the Fed to be an institution committed to global financial stability, which touched another nerve 
on the Right.  Details of the Fed’s support for foreign banks and central banks antagonized right-
wing legislators, who have long opposed “internationalism,” foreign aid, and organizations like 
the IMF that backstop the international financial system.
61
 
 In short, the disclosures may have led the Federal Reserve to be associated with 
“globalization,” “bailouts,” and “excessive government intervention,” thereby reversing the 
Right’s traditional support for the central bank.  Among Republicans, suspicion that the Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing programs both improved President Obama’s reelection prospects 
and imply higher future inflation also raised the ire of the Right. Yet support for annual audits of 
the Fed appears closely tied to the disclosures. For example, the Republican Party made Fed 
audits a central plank in its 2012 election platform: “Because the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy actions affect both inflation and economic activity, those actions should be transparent. 
Moreover, the Fed’s important role as a lender of last resort should also be carried out in a more 
transparent manner. A free society demands that the sun shine on all elements of government. 
Therefore, the Republican Party will work to advance substantive legislation that brings 
                                                 
61
 Milner and Tingley 2011. 
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transparency and accountability to the Federal Reserve, the Federal Open Market Committee, 
and the Fed’s dealings with foreign central banks.”62 
 Will the Right’s opposition to the Federal Reserve persist beyond the current economic 
downturn and impinge on the Fed’s independence?  This was the pervasive question at the Fed’s 
annual symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming in the fall of 2012.
63
  My analysis suggests that 
the globalization of financial intermediation poses an important long-run political challenge for 
the Fed and its supporters.  Inasmuch as foreign banks continue to hold substantial liabilities in 
U.S. dollars, the Federal Reserve will be on the hook to act as a global lender of last resort. This 
is evident today as the dependence of European banks on dollar financing and has led the Federal 
Reserve to extend its central bank swap arrangements to deal with dollar liquidity problems 
associated with the Eurozone debt crisis.
64
  While its operations may be increasingly global, the 
Federal Reserve’s legitimacy with the Right appears to end at the water’s edge, leaving the Fed 
on the horns of a classic “globalization vs. domestic politics” dilemma.65  With its political 
support in the United States dwindling, the Fed’s continuing extension of liquidity services to 
non-U.S. banks will likely provoke greater anti-Fed sentiment from the Right. 
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63
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Table 1: Broad-Based Federal Reserve Emergency Programs Covered by the GAO Audit 
 
Dollars, in billions 
 
Broad-based programs 
 
 
Peak dollar  
amount  
outstanding 
 
Balance  
as of 
6/29/2011 
 
Description 
 
 
TAF - Term Auction Facility 
(Dec. 12, 2007–Mar. 8, 2010) 
 
$493 
 
  
$0 
 
  
Auctioned one-month and three-
month discount window loans to 
eligible depository institutions  
Dollar Swap Lines (Dec. 12, 
2007–Feb. 1, 2010)a 
 
 
586 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
Exchanged dollars with foreign 
central banks for foreign currency 
to help address disruptions in 
dollar funding markets abroad  
TSLF - Term Securities 
Lending Facility (Mar. 11, 
2008–Feb. 1, 2010) 
236 
 
 
0 
 
 
Auctioned loans of U.S. Treasury 
securities to primary dealers 
against eligible collateral 
PDCF - Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (Mar. 16, 2008–Feb. 
1, 2010) 
130 
 
 
0 
 
 
Provided overnight cash loans to 
primary dealers against eligible 
collateral 
AMLF - Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
Provided loans to depository 
institutions and their affiliates to 
finance purchases of eligible 
asset-backed commercial paper 
from money market mutual funds 
CPFF - Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (Oct. 7, 
2008–Feb. 1, 2010) 
 
 
 
348 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
Provided loans to a special 
purpose vehicle to finance 
purchases of new issues of asset-
backed commercial paper and 
unsecured commercial paper 
from eligible issuers 
MMIFF - Money Market 
Investor Funding Facility (Oct. 
21, 2008 but never used)  
 
 No loans 
provided 
 
  
0 
 
 
 
Created to finance the purchase 
of eligible short-term debt 
obligations held by money 
market mutual funds 
TALF - Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (Nov. 
25, 2008–June 30, 2010) 
48 
 
 
13 
 
 
Provided loans to eligible 
investors to finance purchases of 
eligible asset-backed securities 
a 
To deal with ongoing dollar liquidity shortages, dollar swap lines with the European Central 
Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Swiss National Bank were reopened in 
May 2010 and have been extended to February 2014. Source: United States General Accounting 
Office (2011). 
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Table 2: Largest CPFF Borrowers (U.S. dollars in billions) 
Rank Issuer of unsecured commercial 
paper or sponsor of ABCP issuer 
ABCP 
 
Unsecured 
commercial 
paper 
Issuer 
total 
Percent of 
total CPFF 
issuance 
1 UBS AG (Switzerland)  0.00  74.50  74.50  10.10 
2 American International Group  36.3 24 60.2 8.2 
3 Dexia SA (Belgium)  0 53.5 53.5 7.2 
4 Hudson Castle  53.3 0 53.3 7.2 
5 BSN Holdings (United Kingdom)  42.8 0 42.8 5.8 
6 The Liberty Hampshire Company  41.4 0 41.4 5.6 
7 Barclays PLC (United Kingdom)  0 38.8 38.8 5.3 
8 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 
(United Kingdom)  
24.8 13.7 38.5 5.2 
9 Fortis Bank SA/NV (Belgium)  26.9 11.6 38.5 5.2 
10 Citigroup Inc.  12.8 19.9 32.7 4.4 
11 Natixis (France)  4.7 22.3 27 3.7 
12 General Electric Co  0 16.1 16.1 2.2 
13 Ford Credit  15.9 0 15.9 2.1 
14 Bank of America Corporation  0 14.9 14.9 2 
15 State Street Corporation  14.1 0 14.1 1.9 
16 GMAC LLC  13.5 0 13.5 1.8 
17 KBC BANK NV (Belgium)  9 2.3 11.3 1.5 
18 ING Group NV (Netherlands)  0 10.9 10.9 1.5 
19 Dresdner Bank AG (Germany)  5.1 4.9 10 1.4 
20 Northcross (United Kingdom)  8.6 0 8.6 1.2 
21 WestLB (Germany)  8.2 0 8.2 1.1 
22 Merrill Lynch & Co  0 8 8 1.1 
23 Allied Irish Bank (Ireland)  0 6.6 6.6 0.9 
24 Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 
(Germany)  
0 6.2 6.2 0.8 
25 Handelsbanken (Sweden)  0 6 6 0.8 
 All Others  24.9 61.8 86.7 11.80 
 Total  342.3 395.9 738.3 100.00 
 
Notes: Shaded rows indicate foreign financial institutions. Data are from United States General 
Accounting Office (2011), Table 20, p. 196. Borrowing is aggregated at the parent company 
level and includes borrowing by branches, agencies, subsidiaries, and sponsored ABCP conduits. 
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Table 3: Largest TAF Borrowers at the Parent Company Level 
 
Rank Parent company of TAF borrowing institution Total TAF loans  
(Billions USD) 
Percent of total 
1 Bank of America Corporation  280  7.3 
2 Barclays PLC (United Kingdom)  232 6.1 
3 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (United Kingdom) 212 5.5 
4 Bank of Scotland PLC (United Kingdom)  181 4.7 
5 Wells Fargo & Co.  159 4.2 
6 Wachovia Corporation  142 3.7 
7 Societe Generale SA (France) 124 3.3 
8 Dresdner Bank AG (Germany) 123 3.2 
9 Citigroup Inc.  110 2.9 
10 Bayerische Landesbank (Germany)  108 2.8 
11 Dexia AG (Belgium)  105 2.8 
12 Norinchukin Bank (Japan)  105 2.8 
13 JP Morgan Chase & Co.  99 2.6 
14 UniCredit SpA (Italy)  97 2.5 
15 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. (Japan) 84 2.2 
16 WestLB AG (Germany)  78 2.1 
17 Deutsche Bank AG (Germany) 77 2 
18 Regions Financial Corporation  72 1.9 
19 BNP Paribas SA (France)  64 1.7 
 20    Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan)    56    1.5   
 21    UBS AG (Switzerland)    56    1.5   
 22    HSH Nordbank AG (Germany)    53    1.4   
 23    Mizhuo Financial Group, Inc. (Japan)    51    1.3   
 24    Commerzbank AG  (Germany)  51    1.3   
 25    Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (Germany)    47    1.2   
  All others    1,051    27.5   
  Total    3,818    100.0   
 
Notes: Shaded rows indicate foreign financial institutions. Data are from United States General 
Accounting Office (2011), Table 30, pp. 231-32. Total borrowing is aggregated at the parent 
company level and includes borrowing by branches, agencies, and subsidiaries for foreign 
financial organizations. 
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Table 4: Largest Borrowers at the Fed’s Discount Window, August 2007 to April 2010 
 
Rank Origination 
Date 
Borrower Maturity 
Date 
Peak 
Borrowing 
(Billions 
USD) 
1 10/1/2008 AIG 9/22/2010 61.00 
2 10/29/2008 CPFF 1/27/2009 56.56 
3 9/26/2008 BANK OF NY MELLON 9/29/2008 44.11 
4 12/31/2008 DEXIA CREDIT LOCAL NY BR (Belgium) 1/5/2009 37.00 
5 11/6/2008 DEPFA BK PLC NY BR (Ireland) 11/7/2008 28.50 
6 3/28/2008 JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA 3/31/2008 28.50 
7 10/6/2008 WACHOVIA BK NA 1/2/2009 23.00 
8 10/6/2008 ROYAL BK OF SCOTLAND PLC NY B (United Kingdom) 10/7/2008 8.40 
9 3/27/2008 BANK OF NY 3/28/2008 7.50 
10 10/14/2008 SOVEREIGN BK 10/15/2008 7.26 
11 9/29/2008 FORTIS BK SA/NV NY BR (Belgium) 9/30/2008 6.96 
12 11/24/2008 US CENTRAL FCU 11/25/2008 6.00 
13 9/17/2008 BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC NY BR (United Kingdom) 10/17/2008 5.00 
14 9/19/2008 SOCIETE GENERALE NY BR (France) 12/18/2008 4.00 
15 10/8/2008 MS CO 10/9/2008 3.63 
16 5/28/2008 ERSTE BK OESTERREICHISCH NY BR (Austria) 6/6/2008 3.50 
17 10/9/2008 MORGAN STANLEY BK NA 10/14/2008 3.25 
18 6/30/2008 DEUTSCHE BK AG NY BR (Germany) 7/1/2008 3.04 
19 3/28/2008 CALYON NY BR (France) 4/4/2008 3.00 
20 9/16/2008 NORINCHUKIN BK NY BR (Japan) 12/15/2008 3.00 
21 12/22/2008 WESTERN CORP FCU 12/23/2008 2.75 
22 5/19/2008 HSH NORDBK AG NY BR (Germany) 8/15/2008 2.50 
23 9/18/2008 LANDESBK BADEN WUERTTEMB NY (Germany) 10/16/2008 2.50 
24 3/31/2008 RBS CITIZENS NA 4/1/2008 2.24 
25 10/7/2008 COMMERZBANK AG NY BR (Germany) 1/5/2009 2.00 
26 9/18/2008 WASHINGTON MUT BK 9/22/2008 2.00 
27 6/20/2008 BANK OF AMER NA 6/23/2008 1.70 
28 4/10/2008 BNP PARIBAS EQUITABLE TOWER B (France) 4/11/2008 1.64 
29 9/22/2008 ABCP - JPMORGAN CHASE BK 9/29/2008 1.15 
30 9/29/2008 BANK TOK-MIT UFJ NY BR (Japan) 10/8/2008 1.00 
 
Notes:  Shaded rows indicate foreign financial institutions. These data are from Bloomberg 
News, which compiled the Fed’s court-ordered discount window data into spreadsheets and 
released them at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-data-compiled-
by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html. 
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Table 5: Federal Reserve Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines with Foreign Central Banks 
 
Foreign Central Bank (date announced) Number of 
Transactions 
Peak Amount  
(Billions USD) 
Peak Trade 
Date 
European Central Bank (12/12/2007) 271 170.93 Oct 15 2008 
Bank of England (09/18/2008) 114 76.31 Oct 15 2008 
Bank of Japan (09/18/2008) 35 50.17 Oct 21 2008 
Swiss National Bank (12/12/2007) 81 13.11 Jan 13 2009 
Danmarks Nationalbank (09/24/2008) 19 10.00 Oct 24 2008 
Sveriges Riksbank (09/24/2008) 18 10.00 Oct 15 2008 
Reserve Bank of Australia (09/24/2008) 10 10.00 Sep 26 2008 
Norges Bank (09/24/2008) 8 7.05 Jan 27 2009 
Bank of Korea (10/29/2008) 10 4.00 Dec 2 2008 
Banco de Mexico (10/29/2008) 3 3.22 Apr 21 2009 
Bank of Canada (09/18/2008) 0 0 - 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (10/28/2008) 0 0 - 
Banco Central do Brasil (10/29/2008) 0 0 - 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (10/29/2008) 0 0 - 
 
Notes: These data cover the swap agreements that ran between December 1, 2007 and February 
1, 2010. Peak amount represents the largest dollar swap transaction under the arrangement.  Peak 
trade date indicates the date the largest swap took place.  The central banks of Canada, New 
Zealand, Brazil, and Singapore did not draw on their swap lines. These data are derived from the 
Fed’s disclosures at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_swaplines.htm  
  
  
43 
 
Table 6: Fed’s Selection of Central Banks for Dollar Swap Lines 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Swap Line Swap Line Swap Line Swap Line 
     
U.S. Bank Exposure (% world) 0.070*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.049*** 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.031) (0.015) 
     
GDP (% world)  98.117* 50.128 -14.882 
  (56.492) (63.961) (20.244) 
     
Liquid Liabilities (% world)  -71.434*** -59.348**  
  (21.541) (25.660)  
     
Bilateral Trade  -12.218 -4.053  
(% total U.S. trade)  (15.422) (16.236)  
     
Inflation (ave 1997-2007)  -0.960*** -1.094*** -0.362** 
  (0.258) (0.381) (0.146) 
     
Reserves (% of GDP)  -2.879*** -3.642**  
  (0.955) (1.486)  
     
Dollar Shortages   -0.006 -0.030** 
   (0.005) (0.013) 
     
Global Financial Center    4.299* 
    (2.393) 
     
Constant -2.202*** 0.629 2.311* -0.232 
 (0.231) (0.647) (1.286) (0.628) 
     
Observations 149 116 33 39 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.59 0.79 0.75 0.62 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.006 
Log Pseudolikelihood -18.85 -8.274 -5.459 -9.687 
Wald Chi-Squared 12.38 32.12 17.26 16.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Notes: The dependant variable is SWAP LINE which equals one if the FOMC selected a foreign 
central bank for a dollar swap arrangement, zero otherwise. Since the ECB received a swap line, 
I code a single observation for the Eurozone and then sum (or average, where appropriate) 
covariate values for its twelve member countries in 2007. 
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Table 7: House Voting on “Audit the Fed”  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dems Dems Dems Dems All 
      
Bank Contributions -71.374*** 
(26.214) 
-98.493*** 
(28.541) 
-94.135*** 
(28.700) 
-100.912*** 
(35.028) 
-95.293*** 
(27.059) 
      
DW-Nominate  3.659*** 
(0.848) 
3.618*** 
(0.880) 
3.108*** 
(0.935) 
3.544*** 
(0.551) 
      
Social Security   1.683 
(2.831) 
1.840 
(2.976) 
1.651 
(2.950) 
      
Foreclosure Rate   13.335 
(15.613) 
12.174 
(16.050) 
12.332 
(16.280) 
      
Bank HQ    -0.046 
(0.665) 
-0.057 
(0.663) 
      
Chamber Seniority    -0.048** 
(0.021) 
-0.045** 
(0.019) 
      
Finance Committee    0.158 
(0.323) 
0.152 
(0.306) 
      
Constant 0.085 
(0.107) 
1.570*** 
(0.353) 
1.201* 
(0.653) 
1.313* 
(0.672) 
1.487** 
(0.596) 
Observations 186 185 185 182 416 
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.117 0.121 0.143 0.518 
P-Value 0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -125.6 -113.0 -112.5 -107.9 -108.4 
Wald Chi2 7.413 26.95 26.59 35.28 59.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
Notes: The dependant variable is VOTE, a member’s vote on “Audit the Fed” where “yes” = 1 
and “no” = 0.  Probit Models 1-4 are for Democrats only.  Model 5 is for all representatives. 
DW-Nominate measures the “left-right” ideology of representatives and ranges from -1 to 1, 
with higher values indicating a more right-wing ideology. See the text for the definitions of other 
variables.  
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Figure 1: TAF and CPFF Borrowing by Country of the Parent Company  
 
 
Source: Adapted from United States General Accounting Office (2011), Figure 10, p.134. 
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Figure 2: Cross-Border Banking and the Onset of the Dollar Liquidity Crisis 
 
 
Notes: Adapted from Shin (2012). After 1999, foreign banks, particularly in Europe, began 
investing heavily in U.S. subprime assets via the shadow banking system.  They funded these 
asset purchases by borrowing dollars in U.S. wholesale markets, particularly from U.S. money 
market funds. When these wholesale funding markets froze up in October 2008 after the 
Lehmann failure, foreign banks could not roll-over their short-term dollar liabilities. In response 
to this dollar liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve served as global lender-of-last-resort, creating 
liquidity to meet the foreign demand for U.S. dollars. 
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Figure 3: Federal Reserve Dollar Swap Agreements 
 
 
 
Note: In a swap agreement, the Federal Reserve temporarily provides a central bank with U.S. 
dollars in exchange for its currency at a fixed exchange rate and receives a fee.  That central 
bank in turn lends those dollars to private institutions on a collateralized basis and assumes any 
credit risk. 
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Figure 4: Central Bank Liquidity Swaps held by the Federal Reserve 
 
 
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Central 
Bank Liquidity Swaps [SWPT]; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SWPT; accessed July 7, 2013. 
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Notes: Predictive margins (with 95% confidence intervals) of a central bank receiving a Fed 
swap line using Model 3 from Table 6, holding covariates to their means while increasing U.S. 
BANK EXPOSURE from its minimum to its maximum. 
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Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Bank Exposure on Swap Line Selection
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Notes:  The figure displays the predicted marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals of 
BANK CONTRIBUTIONS on voting “yes” to Audit the Fed. The estimates are based on partial 
derivatives from Model 4 in Table 7. 
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Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Bank Contributions on "Audit the Fed" Voting
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Notes The figure displays the predicted marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals of BANK 
CONTRIBUTIONS on voting “yes” to Audit the Fed. The estimates are based on partial 
derivatives from Model 4 in Table 7.  
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Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Dem's Ideology on "Audit the Fed" Voting
Appendix 1: Correlation Matrix for the SWAP LINE Regressions 
 
 US Bank 
Exposure 
GDP Liquid 
Liabilities 
Bilateral 
Trade 
Inflation Reserves Dollar 
Shortage 
Global Fin. 
Center 
US Bank Exposure 1        
GDP 0.8077 1       
Liquid Liabilities 0.6494 0.6482 1      
Bilateral Trade 0.5378 0.5534 0.5672 1     
Inflation -0.1573 -0.1006 -0.1647 -0.1678 1    
Reserves -0.2492 -0.1764 -0.0581 -0.0895 0.1238 1   
Dollar Shortage -0.754 -0.7771 -0.2967 -0.3801 0.0066 0.3413 1  
Global Fin. Center 0.6531 0.455 0.5903 0.4939 -0.2089 0.0731 -0.1826 1 
 
  
